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6Introduction
Introduction
The Corona crisis1 has had a devastating effect on the global 
economy and could end up being worse than the Great 
Financial Crisis (GFC). Some commentators have already 
suggested that the decline in economic activity could be 
the most marked for several centuries. Unlike the GFC, the 
Corona crisis was triggered by an external shock. Govern-
ments responded to this shock by offering liquidity to the 
real economy, either directly or indirectly by guaranteeing 
new bank lending.
So far European banks have weathered the storm but will 
they be able to withstand a prolonged economic down-
turn? This paper suggests that the fortunes of European 
banking systems will depend on the economic recovery we 
experi ence. If we witness a “V-shaped” recovery as cur-
rently forecast by the European Commission, for example, 
then banks in the majority of EU member states might be 
able to survive unscathed. The picture could look very dif-
ferent if the recovery turns out to be more sluggish though. 
The paper suggests that capital ratios – one of the key 
benchmarks used to assess the stability of banking sys- 
tems – could drop dramatically in a number of member 
states such as France and Spain to well below what super-
visors generally consider to be “sound” even under stress 
conditions. With the situation looking less severe in other 
member states such as Germany or the Netherlands, this 
could renew political tensions seen last during the euro 
area sovereign debt crisis. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section “The Corona 
crisis” presents the latest economic forecasts and con-
trasts the current crisis with the GFC. In Section “Could the 
1 We use “Corona crisis” to describe the pandemic caused by COVID-19,  
the most recently discovered coronavirus.
Corona crisis undermine the financial stability of the Euro-
pean banking sector?” the paper draws on the results of 
the 2018 EBA adverse stress test. Comparing the 2018 EBA 
adverse scenario with a plausible “ticked-shaped” recov-
ery post-Corona, the paper presents illustrative impacts 
on capital ratios in a selected number of EU member states. 
Section “Concluding Comments” looks at the role of Euro-
pean-wide policy responses to deal with the crisis and what 
the Corona crisis might mean for the future of the EU’s 
Banking Union and Capital Markets Union.
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a much sharper recovery (+ 8.5 %) in 2021 than both the 
IMF and European Commission. As a result, according to it, 
the level of GDP at the end of 2021 would be similar to that 
at the beginning of 2020 (ifo Institut, 2020). The European 
Central Bank (ECB) forecast for the euro area captures the 
uncertainty by looking at three different scenarios, which 
differ in the severity and length of the lockdown measures. 
They predict that real GDP will fall by 5 percent, 8 percent 
and 12  percent in the mild, medium and severe versions 
respectively (Chart 1).
The Corona crisis
A dramatic economic outlook worse  
than the Great Financial Crisis
In the first quarter of this year, euro area GDP fell by 
3.8 percent quarter on quarter and by 3.3 percent on a year-
on-year basis (Eurostat, 2020). This is the sharpest contrac-
tion in GDP since comparable records began in 1995 despite 
only covering the first few weeks of the economic and social 
lockdown imposed by governments around the world.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts euro 
area GDP to fall by 7.5 percent this year before rebounding 
by just under 5 percent in 2021 (IMF, 2020b). The current 
forecast for 2020 is thus significantly worse than the reces-
sion during the GFC in 2009 when euro area GDP dropped 
by a shade over 4 percent. If confirmed, this would be the 
worst peacetime economic deterioration since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s (IMF, 2020c).2 The European Com-
mission’s Spring 2020 forecast paints a similar picture for 
2020 (though there are country variations) but is gener-
ally more optimistic for 2021, predicting a much stronger 
(“V-shaped”) recovery in most EU member states than the 
IMF (EU Commission, 2020a) (Table 1).
Some policy makers have already warned that the Corona 
pandemic could possibly turn out to be the worst economic 
crisis in several centuries (Vlieghe, 2020).
The high degree of uncertainty around these forecasts is 
illustrated by the case of Germany: the ifo Institut forecasts 
2 On 8th May IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva raised the 
prospect that the IMF’s April 2020 WEO forecast might have to be revised 
downwards, see: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/09/imf-
warns-of-further-drop-in-global-growth-due-to-covid-19
GDP growth forecasts
(selected EU member states, year-on-year %, real GDP)
IMF April 2020 WEO EU Spring 2020
2020 2021 2020 2021
Germany – 7.0 5.2 – 6.5 5.9
Finland – 6.0 3.1 – 6.3 3.7
France – 7.2 4.5 – 8.2 7.4
Greece – 10.0 5.1 – 9.7 7.9
Italy – 9.1 4.8 – 7.7 6.3
Netherlands – 7.5 3.0 – 6.8 5.0
Poland – 4.6 4.2 – 4.3 4.1
Spain – 8.0 4.3 – 9.4 7.0
euro area – 7.5 4.7 – 7.7 6.3
Table 1  |  Sources: International  
Monetary Fund (2020a)  
and EU Commission (2020a).
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The Corona pandemic: another type of shock
Many commentators have compared the current crisis 
with the GFC. One of its key characteristics was contagion 
from the financial system seeping into the real economy. 
Faced with too little capital, banks cut lending to the real 
econo my, leading to a credit crunch, which in turn led to a 
deep recession and subsequently a sharp rise in non-per-
forming loans (NPLs). A related issue was the liquidity mis-
match between assets and liabilities held by banks. Annex 1 
discusses the main policy lessons from the GFC.
In contrast to the GFC, the causes of the current crisis are 
not to be found in the financial system or (lack of) access 
to bank credit or funding more generally. Instead, the real 
economy has suffered a major collapse in demand and sup-
ply from the global lockdown, with businesses no longer 
generating the revenue to meet their costs – a liquidity 
issue. The crisis has hit all types of businesses – large and 
small, market leaders and laggards – and has had a dev-
astating effect on labour markets. As such, this crisis not 
only threatens inefficient firms, but also solvent and effi-
cient ones, which simply may not be able to survive the 
prolonged lockdown phase. The crisis has, however, been 
asymmetric in the sense that some sectors and countries 
have been harder hit than others.
Worse still, there is the possibility of a second wave of 
coronavirus infections so that the crisis may well not be 
over once the first lockdown measures have been lifted. The 
crisis thus risks destroying productive capacity in the econ-
omy permanently, affecting its long-term growth potential.
ECB Alternative Corona scenarios
Chart 1 
Source: European Central Bank (2020a).
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European policy makers reacted swiftly to the crisis and 
implemented some of the key policy lessons learnt from the 
GFC (see Annex 1). Their interventions were mainly aimed 
at providing liquidity to the real economy, hoping that this 
would stop a temporary shock translating into long-lasting 
damage to economic activity. Given the lack of time, policy 
interventions had to be broad brushed and generally untar-
geted.
As a result, governments intervened heavily in the real 
economy (e. g. through wage subsidies) and also in the 
financial and credit markets, e. g. Germany’s up to 100 per-
cent credit guarantee scheme of potentially unlimited 
size to private-sector banks or EIB guarantees of € 25 bn 
to deliver up to € 200 bn of private-sector capital.3 These 
schemes are meant to offer liquidity support not only to 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) but also larger 
businesses during the steep recession. Annex 2 provides 
more information on the policy measures taken.
Possible contagion from the real economy to 
the banking sector
Despite the swift policy responses, the impact of the crisis 
on the real economy is becoming increasingly obvious but 
what about the stability of the financial system and the 
banking system in particular? As it did not originate in 
financial markets, it is unclear how this shock might spread 
there over time. Mack (2020) assesses how the crisis could 
 
3 For a detailed summary of European policy actions – which vary markedly 
across countries – see Redeker and Hainbach (2020).
Could the Corona crisis undermine the 
financial stability of the European banking 
sector?
hit banking systems based on the four main vulnerabilities 
arising from market, funding liquidity and concentration 
risks, and weak levels of profitability.
The 2018 EBA stress test scenario
Can European banks withstand the Corona shock? To 
answer this question, it is useful to start with the most 
recent European-wide bank stress tests.4 One lesson from 
the GFC (Annex 1) is that banking supervisors nowadays 
conduct regular stress tests to assess the financial sound-
ness of individual banks or groups of banks under adverse 
economic circumstances. These tests generally try to cap-
ture some stylised macroeconomic shock resulting in a 
recession in the banks’ key markets, which in turn leads 
to an increase in household and corporate default rates, 
in turn leading to non-performing loans.5 The severity of 
the stress tests generally reflects the “risk appetite” of the 
supervisors, which use the insights gained to request the 
supervised banks to make changes to their business models 
or the amounts of capital they hold.6 For comparative pur-
poses supervisors also ask banks to run their internal mod-
els on “baseline” assumptions based on the latest economic 
forecasts.
 
4 In March 2020 the EBA announced to postpone the 2020 stress test as a 
result of the crisis. However, the EBA published the stress test in January.  
In the “adverse” scenario, which was meant to capture a “low for long” 
environment, EU real GDP was modelled to fall by 4.3 % by 2022, according 
to the EBA the most severe scenario to date (EBA, 2020).
5 There are other channels through which banks’ balance sheets can be 
adversely affected in a stress, including market risk. 
6 The European Court of Auditors (2019) has suggested that the 2018 EBA 
adverse stress test would have benefited from a greater focus on risks.
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Corona versus stress test scenario
Chart 2 
Source: European Central Bank (2020a).
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Chart 2a shows the evolution of the 2018 European Banking 
Authority (EBA) baseline and adverse stress test scenario 
for euro area GDP relative to the IMF’s April 2020 World 
Economic Outlook (where year 0 is the pre-crisis year, i. e. 
in the 2018 EBA scenario 2017 and in the IMF 2020 WEO 
2019). The chart shows that the level of euro area real GDP 
is forecast to be much lower in the first year of the Corona 
crisis than in the EBA 2018 adverse scenario but by year 2 
real GDP levels are very similar in both cases (ESRB, 2018). 
The cumulative output loss in both cases is around 4 per-
cent. 
The picture is different for Germany (Chart 2b), where the 
IMF forecasts real GDP to contract less in year 1 and bounce 
back more strongly in year 2 than the euro area average. 
As a result, the level of real GDP is forecast to be higher in 
year 2 in the Corona crisis than in year 2 of the EBA 2018 
adverse scenario. The more optimistic ifo Institut forecasts 
that the level of GDP will be similar in 2021 to that in 2019.
The situation is much worse in Italy (Chart 2c), where the 
IMF forecasts a 9.1 percent GDP contraction this year, fol-
lowed by a 4.8  percent expansion in 2021. If true, this 
would leave Italy’s real GDP about 5 percent lower than the 
pre-Corona level and much lower than under the 2018 EBA 
adverse stress test scenario. France would also do worse 
(Chart 2d).
Unlike earlier European stress tests, the 2018 EBA stress 
test did not set a required “hurdle rate” for capital ratios 
so banks could not officially pass or fail the test. Table 2 
shows the changes in Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) capi-
tal – the highest quality of regulatory capital, as it absorbs 
losses as soon as they occur – in the EU member states in 
the 2018 EBA stress (EBA, 2018a). 
CET1 in EBA 2018 adverse stress test
Act.  
Dec 2017
Adv.  
Dec 2020
 
Change 
2020 / 2017  
(in bps)
European Union 14.51 % 10.32 % – 419
Austria 13.18 % 9.04 % – 414
Belgium 16.32 % 13.47 % – 286
Denmark 18.24 % 13.39 % – 485
Finland 20.10 % 15.28 % – 481
France 13.75 % 9.71 % – 404
Germany 16.00 % 10.23 % – 577
Hungary 15.21 % 13.03 % – 218
Ireland 18.49 % 13.10 % – 539
Italy 13.24 % 9.57 % – 367
Netherlands 15.84 % 11.85 % – 400
Norway 16.21 % 15.03 % – 118
Poland 16.47 % 15.76 % – 71
Spain 12.22 % 9.41 % – 280
Sweden 20.81 % 17.94 % – 287
United Kingdom 14.36 % 8.87 % – 549
Table 2  |  Source: European  
Banking Authority (2020).
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What might happen next?
The starting position for euro area banks at the outset of 
the Corona crisis in terms of their aggregate capital and 
leverage ratios was very similar to that at the end of 2017 
when the 2018 EBA stress test was conducted.7 The insights 
gained from the 2018 EBA stress test thus remain relevant.
Capital ratios might deteriorate sharply in a number of 
euro area countries
If we experience a much weaker recovery than currently 
forecast by, inter alia, the IMF or European Commission, 
then it is likely that NPLs will increase sharply and at dif-
ferent rates across countries.
We use the following scenario: let’s assume that econo-
mies only recover half of their 2020 losses in 2021. This is 
more or less the IMF forecast for Italy and Spain for exam-
ple and in between the ECB’s mild and medium scenarios 
(see Chart 1). To facilitate comparison with the 2018 EBA 
results, we also assume that growth is the same in the third 
year of our illustration as in the third year of the 2018 EBA 
scenario. Charts 3a-3f above illustrate the GDP paths in this 
illustrative scenario vis-a-vis the 2018 EBA adverse sce-
nario for a selected number of countries. 
Our scenario – capturing a “tick-shaped” recovery – leads 
to smaller cumulative output losses after three years than 
the 2018 EBA adverse scenario in Germany and Austria and 
steeper losses in France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.
7 On a transitional definition, the CET 1 ratio stood at 14.58 % in Q4 2017 and 
14.78 % in Q4 2019, while the leverage ratio stood at 5.57 % in Q4 2017 and 
5.68 % in Q4 2019. See https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/
statistics/html/index.en.html
Without up-to-date bank-specific data, it is not possible 
to translate this illustrative macroeconomic scenario into 
firm-specific capital losses. For simplicity’s sake, we there-
fore scale up the declines in Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) 
capital calculated in the 2018 EBA scenario (EBA, 2018b) 
with the ratio of output losses in our Corona scenario to 
output losses in the 2018 EBA adverse scenario.8 For exam-
ple, if CET 1 drops by 10 percent as a result of a 1  percent 
loss in output in the 2018 EBA stress test, and the out-
put loss is 2 percent in our scenario, then CET 1 would drop 
by 20 percent in our case.9 Note that the starting position 
at the end of 2019 was slightly different to that at the end 
of 2017. Table 3 shows the impact on Tier 1 capital across 
countries then.10 
Reflecting the better macroeconomic performance in Ger-
many and Austria in our Corona scenario than in the EBA 
adverse scenario and the modelling assumptions made, 
CET 1 capital would be higher in those two countries at the 
end of 2022 than it was at the end of 2020 in the EBA sce-
nario. Not surprisingly, the more pronounced the drop in 
CET 1 capital, the bigger the output loss relative to the EBA 
scenario. This is particularly marked in Spain where our 
output loss is -2.9  percent compared to the - 0.8  percent 
in the EBA scenario – nearly four times as much. Using 
our assumptions and methodology, the CET 1 ratio drops to 
2 percent as a result. This is probably an overestimate. The 
8 See European Banking Authority (2018b) for summary charts with country 
data.
9 Another way to describe our methodology is that we calculate the elasticity 
of the capital ratio with respect to a change in GDP. 
10 For simplicity, we ignore the implications of the introduction of IFRS9  
on banks’ balance sheets. See European Central Bank (2020e). By scaling 
the impact on the capital ratio based on domestic GDP in our illustrative 
and the EBA adverse scenarios, we also ignore banks’ international expo-
sures.
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before the GFC (IMF, 2020a). To provide a benchmark: the 
2014 EBA stress test set a hurdle rate at 5.5 percent (Bruno 
and Carletti, 2018),11 while the Bank of England (BoE) set 
an aggregate hurdle rate of 7.5 percent for UK banks in its 
2019 annual stress test (Bank of England, 2019). Half of the 
countries considered in our sample would thus have failed 
the hurdle rate set by the BoE.
11 Since then, EBA stress tests have no longer set an explicit hurdle rate.
French and Italian banking systems would also suffer – on 
aggregate – substantial drops.
Banking systems might fall below Basel III capital 
requirements
Our illustrative scenario – which excludes any policy inter-
ventions – suggests that banking systems in a number of 
European countries would likely come under extreme stress 
and would probably fail a rigorous stress test.
On a national aggregate, banking systems in France and 
Spain would, for example, fail to meet the Basel III capital 
requirement of 4.5 percent for CET 1 (Bank for International 
Settlement). In Italy the ratio would be below that in 2008 
Illustrative capital impact of Corona crisis
EBA 2018 adverse stress test Illustrative Corona scenario
Cumulative output  
loss after 3 years
CET 1 capital  
Start
CET 1 capital  
End
Cumulative output  
loss after 3 years
CET 1 capital  
Start
CET 1 capital  
End
Netherlands – 2.1 15.84 11.85 – 3.6 16.5 9.4
Germany – 3.3 16.00 10.23 – 2.1 15.0 11.6
France – 1.5 13.75 9.71 – 3.7 15.0 4.1
Italy – 2.7 13.24 9.57 – 5.1 14.0 6.7
Spain – 0.8 12.22 9.41 – 2.9 12.2 2.0
Austria – 2.8 13.02 9.04 – 2.6 13.8 9.9
Table 3  |  Note: For example, the ratio of GDP decline in the Netherlands in our illustration and in the EBA scenario is  
3.6 / 2.1 = 1.71. In the EBA stress the Dutch capital ratio drops by around 25 % (= 11.85 / 15.84). We then scale up the decline 
with our ratio: 25 %*1.71 = 43 %. Imposing this decline on the new starting point of 16.5 yields 9.4 as the new end point.  
Sources: European Banking Authority (2018b) and authors’ own calculations.
15
Concluding Comments
Concluding Comments
One lesson of the GFC for European policy makers was to 
make banks stronger and better supervised. The EU set up 
a banking union comprising single supervisory and resolu-
tion mechanisms to achieve that. A third element, consid-
ered by many as necessary to complete the union (Carmassi 
et al, 2018), would be a European deposit insurance scheme. 
Significant resistance from a number of EU member states 
has meant that such a scheme has been put on hold so far.
Given the likely divergence in fortunes across countries 
post-Corona, we should not be surprised if resistance to 
a European deposit insurance scheme (and other policies 
perceived to involve “risk sharing” between EU member 
states) become even stronger.
What the Corona crisis means for the EU’s Capital Mar-
kets Union (CMU) initiative is less clear. On the one hand, 
the rationale for CMU is probably stronger than ever, espe-
cially if European banking systems struggle to cope with 
the Corona fallout: Europe needs strong capital markets to 
support a recovery. On the other hand, the Corona crisis has 
already bolstered the role of the public sector – as exempli-
fied by the European Investment Bank – in providing fund-
ing across EU member states. What then is the role of the 
private sector going forward? Can we expect closer collabo-
ration between the public sector and markets in future 
or have the latter been crowded out? Will policy makers, 
faced with the crisis aftermath, potentially including future 
banking crises, have the capacity to progress this project?
Europe faces unprecedented challenges, with some fore-
casters worrying that the Corona crisis could lead to the 
deepest recession in several centuries.
Unlike the Great Financial Crisis, the Corona crisis is the 
result of an exogenous shock. Like the GFC, its severity is 
likely to differ across European countries. This paper shows 
that in the absence of unprecedented fiscal responses to 
support the economic recovery, the Corona crisis could have 
devastating effects on banking systems in some EU member 
states but not necessarily in others.
The nature of the crisis suggests that supporting the eco-
no mic recovery must be the best policy now available to 
protect banking systems from rapidly rising defaults. That 
said, fiscal room for manoeuvre in the countries most 
affected by the Corona crisis is limited, suggesting that a 
European response involving an element of redistribution 
might be required (Odendahl et al, 2020). The European 
Commission’s proposed Next Generation EU rescue plan – 
going beyond previously agreed EU-wide credit facilities – to 
support the most affected regions and countries could be a 
step in the right direction (European Commission, 2020c).
European solidarity might be tested in other areas too.
If our illustrative calculations are at all indicative of what 
might happen to banking systems in EU member states 
over the coming years, then the Corona crisis can also be 
expected to have far-reaching implications for the future of 
European financial markets initiatives, in particular Bank-
ing Union and Capital Markets Union.
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Lesson 3 (global): More effective supervision,  
including stress testing
To reduce the risk of contagion from one run on a bank 
leading to many bank failures, global awareness of the need 
for more effective supervision has increased post-GFC. EU 
member states, for example, agreed on improved supervi-
sion of banks under the Banking Union by the single super-
visory mechanism (SSM) (European Commission). Under 
the SSM, banks – so far in the euro area only – are super-
vised in such a way that they act in accordance with EU 
banking rules and tackle problems early (Banking Union 
also covers a Single Resolution Mechanism). The expanded 
control also includes supervisory and bank stress testing 
(BIS, 2017). Both stress testing frameworks assess banks’ 
capital and liquidity adequacies. Bank stress testing goes 
even further and includes various other objectives, aim-
ing to improve the understanding of risk and adjust busi-
ness practices.
Lesson 4 (specific to Europe): Develop capital markets 
across the EU to complement the banking system
For European policymakers another lesson from the GFC 
was to reduce the real economy’s reliance on banks as a 
source of credit in future. This reliance varies across EU 
member states but is generally much higher than in the 
United States for example, which has a deeper and broader 
capital market. The Capital Markets Union (CMU) is meant 
to address this by developing other (“non-bank”) sources 
of financing such as equity investments and risk capital.
A related objective is to establish a pan-EU capital market 
so that capital can be allocated more efficiently (i. e. optimal 
matching of investments and financing needs) and thus 
Annex 1:  
Lessons from the Great Financial Crisis
Lesson 1 (global): Banks need to hold more and higher 
quality capital to ensure solvency and serve the real 
economy even in stressful times 
A key lesson of the GFC was to make sure that going for-
ward banks would have enough capital to stay solvent in 
order to keep on lending even during a deep recession. 
Therefore, regulators tightened capital requirements to 
ensure that banks can provide credit in any future crisis. 
Member states of the Financial Stability Board, a post-GFC 
innovation, also agreed to introduce countercyclical capital 
buffers (CCyB), which could be released in times of crisis to 
ensure the supply of credit (BIS, 2020).
Lesson 2 (global): Banks need to ensure liquidity to ensure 
cash flows even during a recession
Just like capital, liquidity is important for a well-function-
ing financial system. During the GFC, many banks faced 
liquidity risks from bank runs. Therefore, they today face 
more liquidity regulations as a whole than previously. One 
of these is the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) that states that 
a bank needs to cover a fraction of deposits with high- 
liquid-assets to ensure short-term liquidity. Another is the 
net stable funding ratio (NSFR) to avoid future liquidity 
mismatch and to establish a sustainable funding structure 
(BIS). To ensure an appropriate analysis of a bank’s liquid-
ity and refinancing risk by the supervisory authorities, 
additional monitoring metrics (AMM) for supplementary 
observation have been established (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2019).
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Government credit guarantee schemes to support new bank 
lending. If firms default on these loans, banks will be able 
to recover their losses (partially or fully, depending on the 
guarantee) from the government and thus taxpayer. Exam-
ples include the German guarantees given by the Kred-
itanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) and Italian guarantees 
granted by state-owned SACE. They are not meant to cover 
or be used to refinance existing loans. This implies that 
banks gain no benefit from the guarantees for the majority 
of their loan book.
On the upside, these measures are a contingent liability 
for the government and will not affect the deficit or debt – 
unless called on. They also involve in principle banks’ usual 
credit assessments. On the downside, they may incentiv-
ise banks to provide more credit than they would normally 
give, lowering credit quality and potentially leading to an 
increase in non-performing loans in future (Schich, 2009).
In the EU, these schemes have to be approved under the 
State aid Temporary Framework adopted by the European 
Commission.12
Monetary authorities and financial regulators
In terms of (unconventional) monetary policy, on March 
18th 2020, the ECB announced its Pandemic Emergency 
Purchase Programme (PEPP) to counter the impact of the 
Corona crisis on the economy. The central bank’s govern-
12 For a detailed list of measures taken, see European Commission (2020b). 
The State aid Temporary Framework enables “Member States to accelerate the 
research, testing and production of coronavirus relevant products, to protect jobs 
and to further support the economy in the context of the coronavirus outbreak. The 
amended Temporary Framework complements the many other possibilities already 
available to Member States to mitigate the socio-economic impact of the coronavi-
rus outbreak, in line with EU State aid rules.”
raise productivity across the EU. The above-mentioned 
US model is often cited as a reason why its economy is 
more productive than the EU’s. The reasoning behind the 
objective is that this would address the investment home 
bias and would enable investors to invest their funds across 
borders without any impediment. Similarly, a single cap-
ital market across the EU would ensure a greater choice 
of funding for businesses. By preventing any future frag-
mentation of European capital markets, the CMU would 
also forestall a situation arising as during the GFC, when 
cross-border capital flows dried up, leaving businesses in 
“periphery” countries without access to credit from banks 
in the European core.
Progress on CMU has been slow, with the European Coun-
cil and European Commission keen to revive the initiative 
(European Council, 2019).
Annex 2:  
Policy responses to the Corona crisis 
Governments
Governments provide grants to businesses directly (e. g. 
Germany’s so-called Soforthilfen / Kleinbeihilfen, direct grants 
in Romania or compensations in Denmark), thus bypassing 
the banking sector.
On the upside, this can be quick and doesn’t involve banks 
as an intermediary; on the downside, there are few checks 
and it is open to fraud. In terms of public finances, these 
measures will have an immediate budgetary impact. 
18
Annex
At the same time, national macroprudential authorities 
extended these measures to cover “less significant banks” 
supervised nationally (e. g. Banca d’Italia, 2020). Moreover, 
where possible, macroprudential authorities also lowered 
their country-specific countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) 
(in most cases to 0 %), the Systemic risk buffer (SyRB) and 
the Other Systemically Important Institution (O-SII) buffer 
(ECB, 2020f).14,15
These macroprudential measures involve short- versus 
longer-term trade-offs. On the one hand, they free up cap-
ital so that banks can keep on lending to the real economy 
during the crisis. On the other hand, these measures could 
potentially undermine financial stability – for example by 
encouraging banks to offer loans to more fragile businesses 
or by creating contagion risk within the banking system 
overall – and reverse years of macroprudential regulation 
(Borio and Restoy, 2020).
14 For an up-to-date list, see ESRB (2020b).
15 In most countries, the scope to lower the CCyB was limited by the fact that 
it had not been raised significantly above 0 prior to the Corona crisis.
ing council decided to implement a € 750 billion tempo-
rary asset purchasing programme to stimulate euro area 
economies (ECB, 2020b). Moreover, banks are now allowed 
to post junk-rated bonds (lower than BBB-) as collateral 
at the ECB. This should help banks maintain their financ-
ing ability in the event that more and more loans lose their 
investment grade credit rating (Reuters, 2020). In terms of 
conventional monetary policy, the ECB kept its three main 
interest rates at their historic lows, where they have been 
since September 2019 (ECB, 2020g).
With respect to prudential measures, the ECB relaxed capi-
tal and liquidity requirements for the euro area’s “signifi-
cant” (i. e. systemically most important) banks directly 
supervised by it (Mack, 2020). During times of economic 
crisis banks might get into liquidity and solvency problems. 
Liquidity stress might come from increased withdrawals by 
banks’ clients and, as experienced in the past, volatility in 
wholesale funding.13 Furthermore, the ECB strengthened its 
position as the lender of last resort in the euro area, as the 
governing council decided to offer more immediate bor-
rowing options for illiquid but solvent banks with the help 
of an increase in the longer-term refinancing operations 
(LTROs). These options should come with favourable con-
ditions (ECB, 2020g). These measures were complemented 
by specific guidance on how to use capital. For example, 
the SSM recommended banks not to pay out dividends or 
engage in share buybacks (ECB, 2020c).
13 When the economic uncertainty is high, depositors for example might 
choose to hold an increased amount of cash – in the extreme this might 
lead to “bank runs”. As a result, banks might be forced to fire-sell many 
assets at below market prices to raise enough liquidity to cover the with-
drawals (and is also a reason why governments provide deposit insurance). 
This is a bleak but not unprecedented scenario – there were a number of 
bank runs during the GFC for example.
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